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Rz:$tate v. Arthur Anthony Gonzales, Case # 20020935 
Dear Ms. Bartholomew: 
Based on Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(i), I wish to clarify a concern that some of the 
justices of the Utah Supreme Court expressed yesterday at oral argument in the case listed above. 
Specifically, some justices asked why neither of the defense attorneys below re-issued a 
subpoena for the contested psychological records. I argued that Judge McCleve's ruling 
foreclosed any further requests for in camera review of the psychological records. 
In her memorandum decision, Judge McCleve ruled that because she believed that defense 
counsel obtained the psychological records in bad faith, sanctions were warranted. See Record 
on Appeal ("R.") at 264-66; Addendum. Accordingly, she ordered "that the information so 
obtained by subpoena may not be used at trial and the defense counsel will write an apology to 
the victim for having inappropriately obtained it." R. at 266. 
I hope that this passage clarifies any confusion over trial counsels' actions. Should this Court 
have any further concerns or questions, I would be happy to assist the Court in any way. 
Sincerely, 
Kent R. Hart 
cc: Marian Decker, Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Gregory Skordas, Jack M. Morgan, Jr., Liani Jeanheh, and Douglas Beloof, attorneys for 
amicus curiae 
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STATE V. GONZALES PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
any contact with the victim's family to be arranged through the 
District Attorney's Office* 
In April, two subpoenas were issued to mental health providers 
without copies provided to the victim, her guardian or the 
prosecution. Defense counsel had also obtained mental health 
records of the victim from University Neuropsychiatric Institute 
("UNI") by subpoena, again without sending copies to the victim or 
the opposing party. 
Defense counsel obtained the records from UNI pursuant to a 
signed, notarized Affidavit executed by defense counsel which 
stated that the victim had placed her mental and physical health at 
issue in a case. After complying with the subpoena, UNI informed 
defense counsel that the records had been given to him in error. 
At the time of UNI's acknowledgment of error, the Assistant 
District Attorney was not made aware by defense counsel of the 
claim of error. The prosecution did discover and bring to the 
attention of the Court on April 8ch that defense counsel had 
obtained and kept the records. 
Defense counsel did not inform the Court of the claim of 
error, did not return the documents of UNI and did not turn the 
documents over to the Court until the Court ordered him to do so on 
April 8th. At that time, defense counsel willingly supplied the 
records and freely admitted he had already read, marked and 
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obtained information from the records in preparation for his 
representation of the defendant. Defense counsel believed that 
although he had full access to the records, the defendant himself 
had had limited access to the information his lawyer obtained. 
The information which defense counsel has with respect to 
treatment providers and any conditions from which the victim 
previously suffered comes directly from these medical records. 
Since April 8th' the medical records have been kept under seal 
and reviewed only by the Court. 
Though it may be proper for the Court to review in camera the 
alleged victim's medical records without her waiver of privilege, 
there is no law, even where an exception to privilege allows a 
defendant access to otherwise confidential records, that gives a 
defendant the right to examine all of the confidential information 
or search through files without supervision. 
In this case, defense counsel, without Court knowledge or 
approval, obtained confidential medical records claimed to be 
supplied in error and then defense counsel studied them in aid of 
preparation for his case. 
It certainly is reasonable to conclude that the defendant 
would also have to be informed regarding the information in order 
to participate in his own defense. Further, it is impossible to 
divorce defense counsel's knowledge obtained from the privileged 
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information from his knowledge of the rest of the case or to 
determine or monitor how that knowledge of privileged information 
has affected the strategy and knowledge of the rest of the case. 
Additionally, defense counsel obtained the medical records by 
representing that the victim/patient had "placed mental or physical 
condition at issue as a claim or defense in a lawsuit (emphasis 
added).M Nothing factually supports this representation. The 
patient is the alleged victim of the crime, not a party raising a 
claim or defense. Rather, it is the defendant who seeks the 
information for possible impeachment purposes in aid of his 
defense. 
To interpret the language relied upon by defendant in the 
Affidavit to mean that such privileged information could be 
intended to be obtained for possible purposes of impeachment as 
part of a "defense," without anything factually in support of 
piercing the privilege, would eliminate the privilege altogether 
since any defense, indeed any case, always allows possible 
impeachment of any witness. The language upon which defendant 
relies on its face and by its plain meaning in the context of the 
phrase cannot be so broadly read. The patient must "place mental 
or physical condition at issue as a claim or defense in a lawsuit." 
Merely by being required to take the stand as a witness, the victim 
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has not placed her mental condition at issue as a claim or defense 
in a lawsuit. 
Having obtained access to very personal and possibly 
embarrassing information about the victim/ the defendant asserts 
but has not shown that the victim is "an emotionally unstable and 
troubled young girl who is pathologically dishonest and 
manipulative who fabricated her story in order to prevent her 
mother from marrying Mr. Gonzales." But whether that assertion 
could justify an order requiring health care providers to submit 
privileged records to the Court for an in camera review in aid of 
impeachment is not the issue here. That issue was not timely or 
appropriately brought to the Court. 
The facts here are that defendant, by subpoena, erroneously 
(plaintiff asserts deceptively) obtained, and UNI erroneously 
provided, privileged information without waiver of privilege. And 
most importantly, once error in providing privileged information 
was asserted by UNI, defense counsel did not immediately submit the 
records to the Court to be kept under seal until the issue of error 
could be determined. Instead, he maintained and studied them until 
the prosecution's Motion to Quash came before the Court. 
If the defendant relies on State v. Cardall, 982 P.2d 79 (Utah 
1999) , as the basis for his right to access to victim's records, as 
it appears he does, then he must also accept that the determination 
STATE V. GONZALES PAGE 6 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
of privileged records' discoverability, according to that case, was 
to have been determined by the Court's in camera review before he 
could have acquired access to their contents. Accordingly, in this 
case at the service of the subpoena he could have directed the 
recipients of the subpoenas to turn over the records under seal to 
the Court before he read and studied them. 
Certainly, defense counsel knew the privilege existed. 
Certainly he knew that the prosecution claimed the privilege and 
would strongly oppose any exception to be taken to it. Certainly 
he knew, as well, that UNI asserted error in having complied with 
defendant's subpoena. And before he issued the subpoenas, 
certainly he knew or should have known, that without waiver of 
privilege, the Cardall case implied and required Court scrutiny of 
the information sought prior to piercing the privilege. Finally, 
how could counsel not have known or realized that once he had 
obtained and reviewed the privileged information it would become 
impossible to remove the taint of that knowledge from his 
representation in the case? 
Clearly, the Motion to Quash the subpoenas must be granted. 
Even assuming the defendant's erroneous interpretation (that 
victim's mental state is an element of a claim or defense in the 
criminal trial) is a good faith interpretation of law, still he 
evidences a suggestion of a lack of good faith here by having 
STATE V. GONZALES PAGE 7 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
reviewed the privileged information prior to Court scrutiny. This 
conclusion is supported by the fact that he relies upon the Cardall 
case to claim access to the records which itself also prerequisites 
Court scrutiny prior to access. 
As sanctions, the Court orders that the information so 
obtained by subpoena may not be used at trial and the defense 
counsel will write an apology to the victim for having 
inappropriately obtained it. 
Despite his good character and reputation, by having obtained 
knowledge of the witness which cannot now be erased, defense 
counsel has inserted a question whether the trial can be a fair one 
which is not able to be resolved. Of equal concern, by tainting 
his knowledge of the case with irretractable, impermissible, 
privileged information about the witness, counsel appears to have 
created a conflict that calls into question the professional ethics 
of his continued representation of the defendant. . <7"*>I~" -
Dated this / T d a v of June, 2002. ^_ ^  A^''r 
<^^SHEILA K. MCCTEVE \> '.. < 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE \^ 6;?r*TS of VK<\r. 
